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Abstract
We want to detect whether a particular image
dataset has been used to train a model. We
propose a new technique, radioactive data, that
makes imperceptible changes to this dataset such
that any model trained on it will bear an identi-
fiable mark. The mark is robust to strong varia-
tions such as different architectures or optimiza-
tion methods. Given a trained model, our tech-
nique detects the use of radioactive data and pro-
vides a level of confidence (p-value).
Our experiments on large-scale benchmarks (Im-
agenet), using standard architectures (Resnet-
18, VGG-16, Densenet-121) and training proce-
dures, show that we can detect usage of radioac-
tive data with high confidence (p < 10−4) even
when only 1% of the data used to trained our
model is radioactive. Our method is robust to
data augmentation and the stochasticity of deep
network optimization. As a result, it offers a
much higher signal-to-noise ratio than data poi-
soning and backdoor methods.
1. Introduction
The availability of large-scale public datasets has acceler-
ated the development of machine learning. The Imagenet
collection (Deng et al., 2009) and challenge (Russakovsky
et al., 2015) contributed to the success of the deep learn-
ing architectures (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). The annotation
of precise instance segmentation on the large-scale COCO
dataset (Lin et al., 2014) enabled large improvements of ob-
ject detectors and instance segmentation models (He et al.,
2017). Even in weakly-supervised (Joulin et al., 2016; Ma-
hajan et al., 2018) and unsupervised learning (Caron et al.,
2019) where annotations are scarcer, state-of-the-art results
are obtained on large-scale datasets collected from the Web
(Thomee et al., 2015).
Machine learning and deep learning models are trained to
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Figure 1. Illustration of our approach: we want to determine
through a statistical test (p-value) whether a network has seen a
marked dataset or not. The distribution (shown on the histograms)
of a statistic on the network weights is clearly separated between
the vanilla and radioactive CNNs. Our method works in the cases
of both white-box and black-box access to the network.
solve specific tasks (e.g. classification, segmentation), but
as a side-effect reproduce the bias in the datasets (Torralba
et al., 2011). Such a bias is a weak signal that a particular
dataset has been used to solve a task. Our objective in this
paper is to enable the traceability for datasets. By intro-
ducing a specific mark in a dataset, we want to provide a
strong signal that a dataset has been used to train a model.
We thus slightly change the dataset, effectively substituting
the data for similar-looking marked data (isotopes).
Let us assume that this data, as well as other collected data,
is used to train a convolutional neural network (convnet).
After training, the model is inspected to assess the use of ra-
dioactive data. The convnet is accessed either (1) explicitly
when the model and corresponding weights are available
(white-box setting), or (2) implicitly if only the decision
scores are accessible (black-box setting). From that infor-
mation, we answer the question of whether any radioactive
data has been used to train the model, or if only vanilla data
was used. We want to provide a statistical guarantee with
the answer, in the form of a p-value.
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Passive techniques such as those employed to measure
dataset bias (Torralba et al., 2011) or to do membership
inference (Sablayrolles et al., 2019; Shokri et al., 2017)
cannot provide sufficient empirical or statistical guaran-
tees. More importantly, their measurement is relatively
weak and therefore cannot be considered as an evidence:
they are likely to confuse datasets having the same under-
lying statistics. In contrast, we target a p-value much below
0.1%, meaning there is a very low probability that the re-
sults we observe are obtained by chance.
Therefore, we focus on active techniques, where we apply
visually imperceptible changes to the images. We consider
the following three criteria: (1) The change should be tiny,
as measured by an image quality metric like PSNR (Peak
Signal to Noise Ratio); (2) The technique should be reason-
ably neutral with respect to the end-task, i.e., the accuracy
of the model trained with the marked dataset should not be
significantly modified; (3) The method should not be de-
tectable by a visual analysis of failure cases and should be
immune to a re-annotation of the dataset. This disqualifies
techniques that employ incorrect labels as a mark, which
are easy to detect by a simple analysis of the failure cases.
Similarly the “backdoor” techniques are easy to identify
and circumvent with outlier detection (Tran et al., 2018).
At this point, one may draw the analogy between this prob-
lem and watermarking (Cox et al., 2002), whose goal is
to imprint a mark into an image such that it can be re-
identified with high probability. We point out that tradi-
tional image-based watermarking is ineffective in our con-
text: the learning procedure ignores the watermarks if they
are not useful to guide the classification decision (Tishby
et al., 2000). Therefore regular watermarking leaves no ex-
ploitable trace after training. We need to force the network
to keep the mark through the learning process, whatever the
learning procedure or architecture.
To that goal, we propose radioactive data. As illustrated
in Figure 1 and similarly to radioactive markers in med-
ical applications, we introduce marks (data isotopes) that
remain through the learning process and that are detectable
with high confidence in a neural network. Our idea is to
craft a class-specific additive mark in the latent space be-
fore the classification layer. This mark is propagated back
to the pixels with a marking (pretrained) network.
This behaviour is confirmed by an analysis of the latent
space before classification. It shows that the network de-
votes a small part of its capacity to keep track of our “ra-
dioactive tracers”.
Our experiments on Imagenet confirm that our radioac-
tive marking technique is effective: with almost invisible
changes to the images (PSNR = 42 dB), and when mark-
ing only a fraction of the images (q = 1%), we are able to
detect the use of our radioactive images with very strong
confidence. Note that our radioactive marks, while visu-
ally imperceptible, might be detected by a statistical anal-
ysis of the latent space of the network. Our aim in this
paper is to provide a proof of concept that marking data is
possible with statistical guarantees, and the analysis of de-
fense mechanisms lies outside the scope of this paper. The
deep learning community has developed a variety of de-
fense mechanisms against “adversarial attacks”: these tech-
niques prevent test-time tampering, but are not designed to
prevent training-time attacks on neural networks.
Our conclusions are supported in various settings: we con-
sider both the black-box and white-box settings; we change
the tested architecture such that it differs from the one em-
ployed to insert the mark. We also depart from the com-
mon restrictions of many data-poisoning works (Shafahi
et al., 2018; Biggio et al., 2012), where only the logistic
layer is retrained, and which consider small datasets (CI-
FAR) and/or limited data augmentation. We verify that the
radioactive mark holds when the network is trained from
scratch on a radioactive Imagenet dataset with standard ran-
dom data augmentations. As an example, for a ResNet-18
trained from scratch, we achieve a p-value of 10−4 when
only 1% of the training data is radioactive. The accuracy of
the network is not noticeably changed (±0.1%).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. We discuss related works in watermark-
ing, and explain how the problem that we tackle is related
to and differs from data poisoning. In Section 3, after in-
troducing a few mathematical notions, we describe how we
add markers, and discuss the detection methods in both the
white-box and black-box settings. Section 4 provides an
analysis of the latent space learned with our procedure and
compares it to the original one. We present qualitative and
quantitative results in different settings in the experimental
section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Related work
Watermarking is a way of tracking media content by
adding a mark to it. In its simplest form, a watermark is
an addition in the pixel space of an image, that is not visu-
ally perceptible. Zero-bit watermarking techniques (Cayre
et al., 2005) modify the pixels of an image so that its
Fourier transform lies in the cone generated by an arbitrary
random direction, the “carrier”. When the same image or
a slightly perturbed version of it are encountered, the pres-
ence of the watermark is assessed by verifying whether the
Fourier representation lies in the cone generated by the car-
rier. Zero-bit watermarking detects whether an image is
marked or not, but in general watermarking also considers
the case where the marks carry a number of bits of infor-
mation (Cox et al., 2002).
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Traditional watermarking is notoriously not robust to ge-
ometrical attacks (Vukotic´ et al., 2018). In contrast, the
latent space associated with deep networks is almost in-
variant to such transformations, due to the train-time data
augmentations. This observation has motivated several au-
thors to employ convnets to watermark images (Vukotic´
et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2018) by inserting marks in this la-
tent space. HiDDeN (Zhu et al., 2018) is an example of
these approaches, applied either for steganographic or wa-
termarking purposes.
Adversarial examples. Neural networks have been
shown to be vulnerable to so-called adversarial exam-
ples (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Szegedy et al., 2014): given a correctly-classified image
x and a trained network, it is possible to craft a perturbed
version x˜ that is visually indistinguishable from x, such
that the network misclassifies x˜.
Privacy and membership inference. Differential pri-
vacy (Dwork et al., 2006) protects the privacy of training
data by bounding the impact that an element of the training
set has on a trained model. The privacy budget  > 0 limits
the impact that the substitution of one training example can
have on the log-likelihood of the estimated parameter vec-
tor. It has become the standard for privacy in the industry
and the privacy budget  trades off between learning statis-
tical facts and hiding the presence of individual records in
the training set. Recent work (Abadi et al., 2016; Paper-
not et al., 2018) has shown that it is possible to learn deep
models with differential privacy on small datasets (MNIST,
SVHN) with a budget as small as  = 1. Individual privacy
degrades gracefully to group privacy: when testing for the
joint presence of a group of k samples in the training set of
a model, an -private algorithm provides guarantees of k.
Membership inference (Shokri et al., 2017; Carlini et al.,
2018; Sablayrolles et al., 2019) is the reciprocal operation
of differentially private learning. It predicts from a trained
model and a sample, whether the sample was part of the
model’s training set. These classification approaches do not
provide any guarantee: if a membership inference model
predicts that an image belongs to the training set, it does
not give a level of statistical significance. Furthermore,
these techniques require training multiple models to sim-
ulate datasets with and without an image, which is compu-
tationally intensive.
Data poisoning (Biggio et al., 2012; Steinhardt et al.,
2017; Shafahi et al., 2018) studies how modifying training
data points affects a model’s behavior at inference time.
Backdoor attacks (Chen et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2017) are
a recent trend in machine learning attacks. They choose a
class c, and add unrelated samples from other classes to this
class c, along with an overlayed “trigger” pattern; at test
time, any sample having the same trigger will be classified
in this class c. Backdoor techniques bear similarity with
our radioactive tracers, in particular their trigger is close
to our carrier. However, our method differs in two main
aspects. First we do “clean-label” attacks, i.e., we perturb
training points without changing their labels. Second, we
provide statistical guarantees in the form of a p-value.
Watermarking deep learning models. A few
works (Adi et al., 2018; Yeom et al., 2018) focus on
watermarking deep learning models: these works modify
the parameters of a neural network so that any downstream
use of the network can be verified. Our assumption is
different: in our case, we control the training data, but the
training process is not controlled.
3. Our method
In this section, we describe our method for marking data.
It consists of three stages: the marking stage where the ra-
dioactive mark is added to the vanilla training images, with-
out changing their labels. The training stage uses vanilla
and/or marked images to train a multi-class classifier using
regular learning algorithms. Finally, in the detection stage,
we examine the model to determine whether marked data
was used or not.
We denote by x an image, i.e. a 3 dimensional tensor with
dimensions height, width and color channel. We consider
a classifier with C classes composed of a feature extrac-
tion function φ : x 7→ φ(x) ∈ Rd (a convolutional neu-
ral network) followed by a linear classifier with weights
(wi)i=1..C ∈ Rd. It classifies a given image x as
argmax
i=1...C
w>i φ(x). (1)
3.1. Statistical preliminaries
Cosine similarity with a random unitary vector u.
Given a fixed vector v and a random vector u distributed
uniformly over the unit sphere in dimension d (‖u‖2 = 1),
we are interested in the distribution of their cosine simi-
larity c(u, v) = uT v/(‖u‖2‖v‖2). A classic result from
statistics (Iscen et al., 2017) shows that this cosine similar-
ity follows an incomplete beta distribution with parameters
a = 12 and b =
d−1
2 :
P(c(u, v) ≥ τ) = Iτ2
(
1
2
,
d− 1
2
)
(2)
=
Bτ2
(
1
2 ,
d−1
2
)
B
(
1
2 ,
d−1
2
) (3)
=
1
B
(
1
2 ,
d−1
2
) ∫ τ2
0
(√
1− t)d−3√
t
dt (4)
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Figure 2. Illustration of our method in high dimension. In high
dimension, the linear classifier that separates the class is almost
orthogonal to u with high probability. Our method shifts points
belonging to a class in the direction u, therefore aligning the linear
classifier with the direction u.
with
Bx
(
1
2
,
d− 1
2
)
=
∫ x
0
(√
1− t)d−3√
t
dt (5)
and
B
(
1
2
,
d− 1
2
)
= B1
(
1
2
,
d− 1
2
)
. (6)
In particular, it has expectation 0 and variance 1/d.
Combination of p-values. Fisher’s method (Fisher,
1925) enables to combine p-values of multiple tests. We
consider statistical tests T1, . . . , Tk, independent under the
null hypothesis H0. Under H0, the corresponding p-
values p1, . . . , pk are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. Hence
− log(pi) follows an exponential distribution, which corre-
sponds to a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom.
The quantity Z = −2∑ki=1 log(pi) thus follows a χ2 dis-
tribution with 2k degrees of freedom. The combined p-
value of tests T1, . . . , Tk is thus the probability that the
random variable Z has a value higher than the threshold
we observe.
3.2. Additive marks in feature space
We first tackle a simple variant of our tracing problem. In
the marking stage, we add a random isotropic unit vector
αu ∈ Rd with ‖u‖2 = 1 to the features of all training
images of one class. This direction u is our carrier.
If radioactive data is used at training time, the linear classi-
fier of the corresponding class w is updated with weighted
sums of φ(x) + αu, where α is the strength of the mark.
The linear classifier w is thus likely to have a positive dot
product with the direction u, as shown in Figure 2.
At detection time, we examine the linear classifier w to
determine if w was trained on radioactive or vanilla data.
We test the statistical hypothesisH1: “w was trained using
radioactive data” against the null hypothesis H0: “w was
trained using vanilla data”. Under the null hypothesis H0,
u is a random vector independent of w. Their cosine simi-
larity c(u,w) follows the beta-incomplete distribution with
parameters a = 12 and b =
d−1
2 . Under hypothesis H1, the
classifier vector w is more aligned with the direction u so
and c(u,w) is likely to be higher.
Thus if we observe a high value of c(u,w), its correspond-
ing p-value (the probability of it happening under the null
hypothesis H0) is low, and we can conclude with high sig-
nificance that radioactive data has been used.
Multi-class. The extension to C classes follows. In
the marking stage we sample i.i.d. random directions
(ui)i=1..C and add them to the features of images of class
i. At detection time, under the null hypothesis, the cosine
similarities c(ui, wi) are independent (since ui are inde-
pendent) and we can thus combine the p values for each
class using Fisher’s combined probability test (Section 3.1)
to obtain the p value for the whole dataset.
3.3. Image-space perturbations
We now assume that we have a fixed known feature extrac-
tor φ. At marking time, we wish to modify pixels of image
x such that the features φ(x) move in the direction u. We
can achieve this by backpropagating gradients in the im-
age space. This setup is very similar to adversarial exam-
ples (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2014). More
precisely, we optimize over the pixel space by running the
following optimization program:
min
x˜, ‖x˜−x‖∞≤R
L(x˜) (7)
where the radius R is a hard upper bound on the change of
color levels of the image that we can accept. The loss is a
combination of three terms:
L(x˜) = − (φ(x˜)− φ(x))> u+ λ1‖x˜− x‖2 + λ2‖φ(x˜)− φ(x)‖2.
(8)
The first term encourages the features to align with u,
the two other terms penalize the L2 distance in both pixel
and feature space. In practice, we optimize this objective
by running SGD with a constant learning rate in the pixel
space, projecting back into the L∞ ball at each step and
rounding to integral pixel values every T = 10 iterations.
This procedure is a generalization of classical watermark-
ing in the Fourier space. In that case the “feature extractor”
is invertible via the inverse Fourier transform, so the mark-
ing does not need to be iterative.
Data augmentation. The training stage most likely in-
volves data augmentation, so we take it into account at
marking time. Given an augmentation parameter θ, the in-
put to the neural network is not the image x˜ but its trans-
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Figure 3. Radioactive images from Holidays (Je´gou et al., 2008) with random crop and PSNR= 42dB. First row: original image. Second
row: image with a radioactive mark. Third row: visualisation of the mark amplified with a ×5 factor. Fourth row: We exaggerate the
mark by a factor ×5, which means a 14dB amplification of the additive noise, down to PSNR=28dB so that the modification become
obvious w.r.t. the original image.
formed version F (θ, x˜). In practice, the data augmenta-
tions used are crop and/or resize transformations, so θ are
the coordinates of the center and/or size of the cropped im-
ages. The augmentations are differentiable with respect to
the pixel space, so we can backpropagate through them.
Thus, we emulate augmentations by minimizing:
min
x˜, ‖x˜−x‖∞≤R
Eθ [L(F (x˜, θ))] . (9)
Figure 3 shows examples of radioactive images and their
vanilla version. We can see that the radioactive mark is
not visible to the naked eye, except when we amplify it for
visualization purposes (last column).
3.4. White-box test with subspace alignment
We now tackle the more difficult case where the train-
ing stage includes the training of the feature extractor. In
the marking stage we use feature extractor φ0 to gener-
ate radioactive data. At training time, a new feature ex-
tractor φt is trained together with the classification matrix
W = [w1, .., wC ]
T ∈ RC×d. Since φt is trained from
scratch, there is no reason that the output spaces of φ0 and
φt would correspond to each other. In particular, neural
networks are invariant to permutation and rescaling.
To address this problem at detection time, we align the sub-
spaces of the feature extractors. We find a linear mapping
M ∈ Rd×d such that φ0(x) ≈ Mφt(x). The linear map-
ping is estimated by L2 regression:
min
M
Ex[‖φ0(x)−Mφt(x)‖22]. (10)
In practice, we use vanilla images of a held-out set (the
validation set) to do the estimation.
The classifier we manipulate at detection time is thus
Wφt(x) ≈ WMφ0(x). The lines of WM form classifi-
cation vectors aligned with the output space of φ0, and we
can compare these vectors to ui in cosine similarity. Un-
der the null hypothesis, ui are random vectors independent
of φ0, φt, W and M and thus the cosine similarity is still
given by the beta incomplete function, and we can apply
the techniques of subsection 3.2.
3.5. Black-box test
In the case where we do not have access to the weights
of the neural network, we can still assess whether the
model has seen contaminated images by analyzing its loss
`(Wφt(x), y). If the loss of the model is lower on marked
images than on vanilla images, it indicates that the model
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Figure 4. Decomposition of learned classifiers into three parts:
the “semantic direction” (y-axis), the carrier direction (x-axis) and
noise (represented by 1−‖x‖2 −‖y‖2, i.e. the distance between
a point and the unit circle). The semantic and carrier direction are
1-D subspace, while the noise corresponds to the complementary
(high-dim) subspace. Colors represent the percentage of radioac-
tive data in the training set, from q = 1% (dark blue) to q = 50%
(yellow). Even when q = 50% of the data is radioactive, the
learned classifier is still aligned with its semantic direction with
a cosine similarity of 0.6. Each dot represents the classifier for a
given class. Note that the semantic and the carrier directions are
not exactly orthogonal but their cosine similarity is very small (in
the order of 0.04).
was trained on radioactive images. If we have unlimited
access to a black-box model, it is possible to train a student
model that mimicks the outputs of the black-box model. In
that case, we can map back the problem to an analysis of
the white-box student model.
4. Analysis of the latent feature space
In this section, we analyze how the classifier learned on a
radioactive dataset is related to (1) a classifier learned on
unmarked images ; and (2) the direction of the carrier. For
the sake of analysis, we take the simplest case where the
mark is added in the latent feature space just before the
classification layer, and we assume that only the logistic
regression has been re-trained.
For a given class, we analyze how the classifier learned
with a mark is explained by
1. the “semantic” space, that is the classifier learned by
a vanilla classifier. This is a 1-dimensional subspace
identified by a vector w∗;
2. the direction of the carrier, favored by the insertion of
our class-specific mark. We denote it by u.
3. the noise space F , which is in direct sum with the
span of vectors w∗ and u of the previous space. This
noise space is due to the randomness of the initializa-
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
random
carrier
classifier
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Figure 5. Analysis of how classification directions re-learned
with a logistic regression on marked images can be decomposed
between (1) the original subspace; (2) the mark subspace; (3) the
noise space. Logistic regression with: q = 2% (Left) or q = 20%
(Right) of the images marked.
tion and the optimization procedure (SGD and random
data augmentations).
The rationale of performing this decomposition is to quan-
tify, with respect to the norm of the vector, what is the dom-
inant subspace depending on the fraction of marked data.
This decomposition is analyzed in Figure 4, where we
make two important observations. First, the 2-dimensional
subspace contains most of the projection of the new vector,
which can be seen by the fact that the norm of the vector
projected onto that subspace is close to 1 (which translates
visually as to be close to the unit circle). Second and unsur-
prisingly, the contribution of the semantic vector is signif-
icant and still dominant compared to the mark, even when
most of the dataset is marked. This property explains why
our procedure has only a little impact on the accuracy.
Figure 5 shows the histograms of cosine similarities be-
tween the classifiers and random directions, the mark di-
rection and the semantic direction. We can see that the
classifiers are well aligned with the mark when q = 20%
or 2% of the data is marked.
5. Experiments
5.1. Image classification setup
In order to provide a comparison on the widely-used vi-
sion benchmarks, we use Imagenet (Deng et al., 2009), a
dataset of natural images with 1,281,167 images belong-
ing to 1, 000 classes. We first consider the Resnet-18 and
Resnet-50 models (He et al., 2016). We perform train-
ing using the standard set of data augmentations from Py-
torch (Paszke et al., 2017). We train with SGD with a mo-
mentum of 0.9 and a weight decay of 10−4 for 90 epochs,
using a batch size of 2048 across 8 GPUs. We use Py-
torch (Paszke et al., 2017) and adopt its standard data aug-
mentation settings (random crop resized to 224× 224). We
use the waterfall learning rate schedule: the learning starts
at 0.8, (as recommended in (Goyal et al., 2017)) and is di-
vided by 10 every 30 epochs. On a vanilla Imagenet, we
obtain a top 1 accuracy of 69.6% and a top-5 accuracy of
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89.1% with our Resnet18. We ran experiments by varying
the random initialization and the order of elements seen
during SGD, and found that the top 1 accuracy varies by
0.1% from one experiment to the other.
5.2. Experimental setup and metrics
We modify Imagenet images by inserting our radioactive
mark, and retrain models on this radioactive data using the
learning algorithm described above. We then analyze these
“contaminated” models for the presence of our mark. We
report several measures of performance. On the images,
we report the PSNR, i.e. the magnitude of the perturbation
necessary to add the radioactive mark. On the model, we
report the p-value that measures how confident we are that
radioactive data was used to train the model, as well as the
accuracy of this model on vanilla (held-out) data. We con-
duct experiments where we only mark a fraction q of the
data, with q ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}.
As a sanity check, we ran our radioactive detector on pre-
trained models of the Pytorch zoo and found p values of
15% for Resnet-18 and 51% for Resnet-50, which is rea-
sonable: in the absence of radioactive data, these values
should be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
5.3. Preliminary experiment: comparison to the
backdoor technique
We experimented with the backdoor technique of Chen et
al. (Chen et al., 2017) in the context of our marking prob-
lem. In general, the backdoor technique adds unrelated im-
ages to a class, plus a “trigger” that is consistent across
these added images. In their work, Chen et al. need to
poison approximately 10% of the data in a class to acti-
vate their trigger. We adapted their technique to the “clean-
label” setup on Imagenet: we blend a trigger (a Gaussian
pattern) to images of a class. We observed that it is possible
to detect this trigger at train time, albeit with a low image
quality (PSNR< 30dB) that is visually perceptible. In this
case, the model is more confident on images that have the
trigger than on vanilla images in about 90% of the cases.
However, we also observed that any Gaussian noise acti-
vates the trigger: hence we have no guarantee that images
with our particular mark were used.
5.4. Results
Same architecture. We first analyze the results in Ta-
ble 1 of a ResNet-18 model with fixed features trained on
Imagenet. We can see that we are able to detect that our
model was trained on radioactive data with a very high con-
fidence for both center crop and random crop. The model
overfits more on the center crop, hence it learns more the ra-
dioactive mark, which is why the p-value is lower on center
% radioactive 1 2 5 10
C
en
te
r
C
ro
p log10(p) <-150 <-150 <-150 <-150
∆acc −0.48 −0.86 −1.07 −1.33
R
an
do
m
C
ro
p log10(p) −38.0 −138.2 <-150 <-150
∆acc −0.24 −0.31 −0.55 −0.99
Table 1. p-value (statistical significance) for the detection of ra-
dioactive data usage when only a fraction of the training data is
radioactive. Results for a logistic regression classifier trained on
Imagenet with Resnet-18 features , with only a percentage of the
data bearing the radioactive mark. Our method can identify with
a very high confidence (log10(p) < −38) that the classifier was
trained on radioactive data, even when only 1% of the training
data is radioactive. The radioactive data has an impact on the ac-
curacy of the classifier: around −1% (top-1).
% radioactive 1 2 5 10
C
en
te
r
C
ro
p
log10(p) −0.66 −1.64 −4.60 −11.37
R
an
do
m
C
ro
p
log10(p) −4.85 −12.63 −48.8 <-150
∆acc −0.1 −0.7 −0.3 −0.5
Table 2. p-value (statistical significance) for radioactivity detec-
tion. Results for a Resnet-18 trained from scratch on Imagenet,
with only a percentage of the data bearing the radioactive mark.
We are able to identify models trained from scratch on only
q = 1% of radioactive data. The presence of radioactive data
has negligible impact on the accuracy of a learned model as long
as the fraction of radioactive data is under 10%.
crop images. Conversely on random crops, marking data
has less impact on the accuracy of the model (−0.24 as op-
posed to −0.48 for q = 1% marked data).
Table 2 shows the results of retraining a Resnet-18 from
scratch on radioactive data. The results confirm that our
watermark can be detected when only q = 1% of the data
is used at train time. This setup is more complicated for our
marks because since the network is retrained from scratch,
the directions that will be learned in the new feature space
have no a priori reason to be aligned with the directions
of the network we used. Table 2 shows two interesting re-
sults: first, the gap in accuracy is less important than when
retraining only the logistic regression layer, in particular
using 1% of radioactive data does not impact accuracy; sec-
ond, data augmentation is actually helping the radioactive
process. We hypothesize that the multiple crops make the
network believe it sees more variety, but in reality all the
feature representations of these crops are aligned with our
carrier which makes the network learn the carrier direction.
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Figure 6. Black-box detection of the usage of radioactive data.
The gap between the loss on radioactive and vanilla samples is
around 0 when q = 20% of the data are contaminated.
Black-box results. We report in Figure 6 the results of
our black-box detection test. We measure the difference be-
tween the loss on vanilla samples and the loss on radioac-
tive samples: when this gap is positive, it means that the
model fares better on radioactive images, and thus that it
has been trained on the radioactive data. We can see that
the use of radioactive data can be detected when a fraction
of q = 20% or more of the training set is radioactive. When
a smaller portion of the data is radioactive, the model fares
better on vanilla data than on radioactive data and thus it is
difficult to tell.
Distillation. Given only black-box access to a model (as-
suming access to the full softmax), we experiment distilla-
tion of this model, and test the distilled model for radioac-
tivity. In this setup, it is possible to detect the use of ra-
dioactive data on the distilled model, with a slightly lower
performance compared to white-box access to the model.
We give detailed results in Appendix A.
5.5. Ablation analysis
Architecture transfer. We ran experiments on different
architectures with the same training procedure: Resnet-50,
VGG-16 and Densenet121. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3: the values and trend are similar to what we obtain
with Resnet-18 (Table 2). This is non-trivial, as there is no
reason that the feature space of a VGG-16 would behave
in the same way as that of a Resnet-18: yet, after align-
ment, we are able to detect the presence of our radioactive
mark with high statistical significance. Specifically, when
q = 2% of the data is radioactive, we are able to detect it
with a p-value of 10−15. This p-value is even stronger than
the one we obtain when retraining the same architecture as
our marking architecture (Resnet-18). We hypothesize that
larger model overfit more in general, and thus in this case
will learn the mark more acutely.
% radioactive 1 2 5 10 20
Resnet-50 −6.9 −12.3 −50.22 −131.09 <-150
Densenet-121 −5.39 −11.63 −41.24 −138.36 <-150
VGG-16 −2.14 −4.49 −13.01 −33.28 −106.56
Table 3. p-value (statistical significance) for radioactivity detec-
tion. Results for different architectures trained from scratch on
Imagenet. Even though radioactive data was crafted using a
ResNet-18, models of other architectures also become radioactive
when trained on this data.
% radioactive 10 20 50 100
log10(p) −3.30 −8.14 −11.57 <-150
Table 4. p-value of radioactivity detection. A Resnet-18 is trained
on Places205 from scratch, and a percentage of the dataset is ra-
dioactive. When 10% of the data or more is radioactive, we are
able to detect radioactivity with a strong confidence (p < 10−3).
Transfer to other datasets. We conducted experiments
on a slightly different setup: we mark images from the
dataset Places205, but use a network pretrained on Ima-
genet for the marking phase. These experiments show that
even if the marking network is fit for a different distribu-
tion, the marking still works and we are able to detect it.
Results are shown in Table 4. We can see that when a frac-
tion q higher than 10% of the training data is marked, we
can detect radioactivity with a strong statistical significance
(p < 10−3).
Correlation with class difficulty. Given that radioactive
data adds a marker in the features that is correlated with the
class label, we expect this mark to be learned by the net-
work more when the class accuracy is low. To validate this
hypothesis, we compute the Spearman correlation between
the class accuracy for each class and the cosine between the
classifier and the carrier: this correlation is negative, with a
p-value of 4× 10−5. This confirms that the network relies
more on the mark when learning with difficult classes.
5.6. Discussion
The experiments validate that our radioactive marks do in-
deed imprint on the trained models. We also observe two
beneficial effects: data augmentation improves the strength
of the mark, and transferring the mask to a larger and
more realistic architectures makes its detection more reli-
able. These two observations suggest that our radioactive
method is appropriate for real use cases.
Limitation in an adversarial scenario. We assume that
at training time, there is no special procedure to take into
account the radioactive data, but rather training is con-
ducted as if it was vanilla data. In particular, a subspace
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analysis would likely reveal the marking direction. This
adversarial scenario becomes akin to that considered in the
watermarking literature, where strategies have been devel-
oped to reduce the detectability of the carrier. Our cur-
rent proposal is therefore restricted to the proof of concept
that we can mark a model through training that is only
resilient to blind attacks such as architectural or training
changes. We hope that follow-up works will address a more
challenging scenario under Kerckhoffs assumptions (Ker-
ckhoffs, 1883).
6. Conclusion
The method proposed in this paper, radioactive data, is a
way to verify if some data was used to train a model, with
statistical guarantees.
We have shown in this paper that such radioactive con-
tamination is effective on large-scale computer vision tasks
such as classification on Imagenet with modern architec-
ture (Resnet-18 and Resnet-50), even when only a very
small fraction (1%) of the training data is radioactive. Al-
though it is not the core topic of our paper, our method in-
cidentally offers a way to watermark images in the classical
sense (Cayre et al., 2005).
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Radioactive data: tracing through training
% radioactive 1 2 5 10 20
log10(p) −1.58 −3.07 −13.60 −34.22 −137.42
Table 5. p-value for the detection of radioactive data usage. A
Resnet-18 is trained on Imagenet from scratch, and a percentage
of the training data is radioactive. This marked network is distilled
into another network, on which we test radioactivity. When 2%
of the data or more is radioactive, we are able to detect the use of
this data with a strong confidence (p < 10−3).
A. Distillation
Given a marked resnet-18 on which we only have black-
box access, we use distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) to train
a second network. On this distilled network, we perform
the radioactivity test. We show in Table 5 the results of this
radioactivity test on distilled networks. We can see that
when 2% or more of the original training data is radioac-
tive, the radioactivity propagates through distillation with
statistical significance (p < 10−3).
